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NEPA THRESHOLD DETERMINATIONS; A FRAMEWORK
OF ANALYSIS
ROBERT D. PELTZ* AND JEFFREY WEINMAN**
The authors suggest that traditional concepts of judidical
review are ineffective in promoting the intent of the National
Environmental Policy Act to inject environmental considerations
into all federal agency decisionmaking. They propose the adop-
tion of a framework of analysis to serve as a guideline for agencies
in making the threshold determination of whether to file an envi-
ronmental impact statement.
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 72
A . W hat is N E PA ? .... ...... ........ ..... ... ....... ........ 72
B . Purpose of the A rticle .......................................... 77
II. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ........................................ 78
A . G en era lly ........................... ..... ................... . 78
B . Sufficiency of the EIS ........................................... 80
C. Substantive Decision ........ ................ 81
D. Threshold Determinations of Significant Impact ................... 81
1. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS ................................... 82
2. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ........................................ 84
3. RATIONAL BASIS ............................................. 85
4. REASONABLENESS ............. ................ ............... 86
5. DE NOVO REVIEW ............................................. 87
II. EXPLANATION OF COURT DIVERSITY UNDER "SCOPE OF REVIEW ANALYSIS" ..... 87
IV. SOLUTION: JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST ...................... 90
V. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS .............................. 92
A . Judicial D eterm inations ......... .. ........................... 92
1. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT ................................... 93
2. THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT .................................... 96
3. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF AGENCY ACTIONS ........................... .... 99
4. EXISTING USES AND ZONING RESTRICTIONS ............................ 102
5. TIMING OF THE THRESHOLD DETERMINATION ...................... 103
6. PROJECT SEGMENTATION AND CUMULATIVE COMPONENT IMPACTS ...... 107
7. CONTROVERSIALITY ........................................... 110
B. Judicially Developed Tests ............................ . 111
VL. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ....................................... 112
A. The Need for a Liberal Construction of the EIS Requirement ........ 112
* Former Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Associate in
the firm of Rossman & Baumberger, P.A., Miami, Florida.
** Former Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review, Clerk to
the Honorable Alan Sternberg, Colorado Court of Appeals.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
B. The Proposed Framework of Analysis ............ ............ . 115
1. NATURAL ENVIRONM ENT ....................................... 115
2. THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT .................................... 116
3. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF AGENCY ACTION ............................ 117
4. EXISTING USES AND ZONING RESTRICTIONS ........................ 118
5 . T IM IN G .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 0
a . F easib ility ............................................. 120
b. Present Availability of Information .............. .... 120
c. Any Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
Should the Project be Implemented ..................... 121
d. Severity of Potential Environmental Effects ............. 121
e. Need for Technology Compels Development ............. 121
6. CUM ULATIVE IM PACT ...... .................................. 122
7. CONTROVERSIALITY .................................... ..... 123
8. PER SE CATEGORIES - ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIONS ..... ... 124
V II. C ONCLUSION .... .. . . ... . ............................ . 125
I. INTRODUCTION
A. What is NEPA?
The National Environmental Policy Act' (NEPA) proclaims
broad policy goals which seek to reverse the previous federal policy
of benign ecological neglect by requiring that federal agencies give
attention to environmental values. NEPA seeks to accomplish this
by imposing upon the federal bureaucracy both substantive2 and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-47 (1970).
2. Section 101, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970) provides:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the pro-
found influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial ex-
pansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances
and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining envi-
ronmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State
and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to
use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assis-
tance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans.
(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continu-
ing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environ-
ment for succeeding generations;




procedural3 mandates to channel agency decisionmaking in accord-
ance with its broad policy statement.
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended conse-
quences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our na-
tional heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports
diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will per-
mit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
(c) The Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful envi-
ronment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the preserva-
tion and enhancement of the environment.
Cases recognizing the substantive mandate of § 101, include: Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. (E.D.F.) v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973);
Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also
Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review under NEPA, 88 HAlv.
L. REv. 735 (1975); Briggs, NEPA as a Means to Preserve and Improve the Environment-The
Substantive Review, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 699 (1974).
3. The relevant portions of § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) provide:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter,
which will insure that present unquantified environmental amenities and values
may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking along with economic
and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term pro-
ductivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact in-
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Section 101 of NEPA provides that environmental concerns are
not to be given superior weight to competing social values. Rather,
they are to be balanced with economic and social considerations in
order to resolve the conflict between protection of the environment
and advancement of other important national goals in the context
of federal government decisionmaking1 "All practicable means" are
to be used to insure the fulfillment of these goals. This substantive
mandate is thus inherently flexible, permitting wide latitude by the
administrators of federal agencies.'
Since wide discretion can breed wide abuse, to insure that the
essence of NEPA be properly distilled, the substantive flexibility of
section 101 is tempered by the procedural provisions of section 102
which must be strictly adhered to and which leave considerably less
room for discretion.' The "action-forcing" requirements of section
102 are thus designed to transform the otherwise noble, but ephem-
eral declarations of section 101 into meaningful and identifiable
statutory duties.7 Most importantly, the procedures so compelled
volved. Copies of each statement and the comments and views of the appropriate
Federal, State and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce
environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council
on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title
5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes
Cases clarifying the procedural directives of NEPA include: Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d
1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Peterson, 409
U.S. 1021 (1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
4. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). See Pizitz, Inc. v. Volpe, 4 E.R.C. 1195
(M.D. Ala.), affd per curiam, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972); E.D.F. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp.
1401, 1403-04 (D.D.C. 1971). But see E.D.F. v. Corps of Engr's, 470 F.2d 289, 299 n.15 (8th
Cir. 1972).
5. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See, e.g., Donovan, The Federal Government and Environmental Control: Administrative
Reform on the Executive Level, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 541 (1971); Hanks & Hanks, An
Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 24 RuTGEs L REv. 230 (1970); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer
in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 643-50 (1970); Yannacone,
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 ENVIR. LAW 8 (1970); Note, The National
Environmental Policy Act: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing? 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 139 (1970). See
also notes 32-35 infra and accompanying text.
6. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112. See discussion
regarding the scope of review for agency threshold determinations Section II D, infra.
7. See the comments of Senator Jackson, NEPA's principal sponsor, at Hearings on S.
[Vol. 31:71
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are to be carried out "to the fullest extent possible."'
Specifically, section 102 directs all agencies of the federal gov-
ernment to utilize a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" to
planning which may have an impact on the environment and to
"identify and develop methods" which would ensure a balanced
consideration of environmental and economic factors. To achieve
this, section 102 (c) provides that all federal agencies
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major federal, actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the
responsible official ...I (emphasis added).
1075, S.237, S. 1752, before the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 116 (1969).
8. This does not qualify § 102 such that it permits agency discretion but rather it reduces
that discretion greatly. The Senate and House conferees who added the "fullest extent possi-
ble" language to NEPA stated:
The purpose of the new language is to make it clear that each agency of the
Federal Government shall comply with the directives set out in . . .[Section
102(2)] unless the existing law applicable to such agency's operations does not
make compliance possible .... it is the intent of the conferees that the provision
"to the fullest extent possible" shall not be used by any Federal agency as a means
to avoiding compliance with the directives set out in section 102. Rather, the
language in section 102 is intended to assure that all agencies of the Federal
Government shall comply with the directives set out in said section "to the fullest
extent possible" under their statutory authorizations and that no agency shall
seek to construe its existing statutory authorizations in a manner designed to
avoid compliance.
Major Changes in S. 1075 as Passed by the Senate, 115 CONG. REC. pt. 30 at 40417-18. See
also 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). The only qualification to the "fullest extent possible" language
of § 102 can be found in § 104 which states:
Nothing in section 4332 or 4333 of this title shall in any way affect the specific
statutory obligations of any Federal agency (1) to comply with criteria or stan-
dards of environmental quality, (2) to coordinate or consult with any other Fed-
eral or State agency, or (3) to act, or refrain from acting contingent upon the
recommendations or certification of any other Federal or State agency.
42 U.S.C. § 4334 (1970). Note the contrasting statutory language of "all practicable means"
utilized in § 101 and "the fullest extent possible" used in § 102. This in itself suggests varying
standards of compliance and consequently varying standards of judicial review.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). This statement is to include a discussion of the follow-
ing factors:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
19761
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This detailed statement is commonly referred to as an Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (EIS).
Administrative agency chiefs therefore must first make a
threshold determination as to whether the action under considera-
tion is "a major federal action significantly affecting the environ-
ment."' 0 A negative finding relieves the agency of the duty to file
an environmental impact statement." Such negative threshold de-
terminations have spawned a great deal of litigation, usually in the
form of suits seeking injunctive relief. 2
Other litigation under NEPA has been based on the allegation
that although an EIS was filed, it was either insufficient, or even
though adequate, the substantive administrative decision to go
ahead with the project was improper in that it gave insufficient
weight to relevant environmental factors.
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (1970).
For a detailed treatment of the technical aspects of preparing an EIS, see Kross,
Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement, 44 U. COLO. L. Rxv. 81 (1972). See
generally, The Environmental Impact Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant Leap, 5
URBAN LAW. 264 (1973); Orloff, Environmental Impact Statement Process, 29 Bus. LAW. 1319
(1974).
10. While there has been substantial litigation concerning the meaning of "major federal
action," this comment will not deal with that issue. See note 11 infra.
11. Such a determination may be made by the agency because the action either (1) is
not a federal action, (2) is not a major action or (3) does not significantly affect the environ-
ment. These three grounds are not always easy to separate conceptually and thus courts and
commentators have reasoned that the statutory term "major federal action significantly
affecting the environment" should be read as one. That is, a minor federal action which has
potentially monumental environmental consequences should not be exempted from the EIS
requirement simply because it can be characterized as not major. To read each factor as an
independent prerequisite to the filing of an impact statement could clearly thwart the intent
of Congress. One author has in fact proposed a sliding scale approach whereby the requisite
finding of major federal action would be reduced to any federal action where the environmen-
tal impact would be severe. The size of the federal action needed to trigger the EIS would
increase as the magnitude of the environmental impact decreased. Comment, Environmental
Law, 26 S.C.L. REv. 119, 134-35 (1974).
For further discussion regarding the potentially anomalous results of separating "signifi-
cant impact" from "major federal action," see Minnesota Public Interest Research Group
(M.P.I.R.G.) v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Scientists' Institute for Public Informa-
tion, Inc. (S.I.P.I.) v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Monroe County Conservation
Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972); N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829
(D.D.C. 1974). But see, Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971).
12. See, e.g., Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club,
Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 31:71
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B. Purpose of the Article
In the absence of any congressional or administrative direction
in setting forth a list of environmental factors or meaningful guide-
lines to be considered in determining whether a proposed action will
significantly effect the environment, 3 litigation concerning these
threshold determinations has resulted in a great deal of confusion.
This confusion is heightened by a judicial tendency to analyze EIS
threshold determinations in terms of scope of review rather than to
directly address the problem of statutory construction created by
NEPA's vague and amorphous triggering standard. Moreover, many
courts have further obscured the issue by failing to adequately dis-
tinguish between the correctness of an agency's threshold determi-
nation of significant impact, the sufficiency of the impact state-
ment, and the agency's subsequent substantive decision to go ahead
with the action despite its environmental aspects, each of which
requires a different legal analysis and the application of a different
scope of review.
The purpose of this article is to attempt to eliminate some of
the confusion surrounding threshold determinations of significant
impact under NEPA. First, it will examine the nature, scope and
effectiveness of past judicial review under the Act. Next, it will
develop the case for adoption of a comprehensive test as a solution
to the confusion. Thirdly, it will survey the existing judicial analysis
of what constitutes a "significant impact" on the environment. Fi-
nally, it will distill from this existing authority a framework of anal-
ysis to serve as a comprehensive test for agencies to use in making
threshold determinations.
13. Cases recognizing the lack of guidance include: First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484
F.2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). It has been widely recognized that:
The legislative history of NEPA is virtually useless in determining the meaning
of the term "significantly". Although "the infirmity of the phrase," has been
noted judicially, Congress apparently has left the initial interepretation to the
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and, in turn, to the agencies them-
selves. The original CEQ guidelines provided that in construing the phrase...
agencies were to consider the overall, cumulative effect of the proposed action
. . . [and] to prepare an EIS where the environmental impact was potential,
controversial, or reasonably anticipated in light of cumulative actions . ...
[Subsequent] CEQ guidelines have provided little further clarification . . .
Note, Threshold Determinations Under Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA: The Case for "Reasona-
bleness" as a Standard for Judicial Review, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 107, 111-12 (1974). See
also The Environmental Impact Statement: A Small Step Instead of a Giant Leap, 5 URBAN
LAW. 264 (1973).
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II. THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. Generally
In ascertaining the appropriate scope of judicial review for
administrative action generally, it is important to first determine
whether the applicable statute provides for judicial review and, if
so, whether Congress has directed a particular standard by which
to gauge the action, Absent express congressional intent to tho con-
trary, there is a basic presumption of reviewability."'
Although NEPA does not expressly provide for judicial review,
courts have reviewed agency decisions under it by either finding
review implicit within the statute itselP5 or by applying to NEPA
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review applicable to
administrative actions generally under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA). In applying the APA standard, the crucial issue
becomes the extent to which the administrative determination is
factual or discretionary as opposed to legal.' 7 Thus the basic prob-
lem is the difficult one of distinguishing between law and fact. This
problem arises because under the APA, questions of law are for
judges to determine, while questions of fact are committed to
agency discretion and thus, for the most part, subject only to lim-
ited review.'" This distinction between law and fact, however, often
becomes quite murky. Legal scholars have vigorously debated it
because there clearly exists a middle ground of mixed law and fact.'9
14. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The requisites of standing and
finality must of course also be met.
15. See, e.g., E.D.F. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1407 (D.D.C. 1971). But see E.D.F.
v. Corps of Engr's, 470 F.2d 289, 299 n. 15 (8th Cir), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1072 (1972).
16. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Most courts follow this approach. See, e.g.,
E.D.F. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 974 (1974).
17. For purposes of simplification, factual and discretionary determinations will be used
more or less interchangeably. They are in fact different notions, and the scope of review
applied to each differs. Generally, the substantial evidence rule obtains for factual issues
while the arbitrary and capricious test applies for discretionary determinations. Nevertheless,
courts often speak of the arbitrary and capricious test in the context of an analysis of factual
versus legal distinctions. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 838 (2d Cir. 1972). In
activity in the context of NEPA, distinctions between fact and discretion are not susceptible
to clear lines of demarcation because often the interpretation and application of relevant facts
involves a degree of discretion. Thus, the arbitrary and capricious standard is applicable to
such "factual" determinations.
18. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (D) (1970); see Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See generally, K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT chs.
28-30, 3d ed. (1972).
19. Compare, K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at § 30.02 (analytical versus practical approach
(Vol. 31:71
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For scope of review purposes, this distinction between law and
fact is crucial because the characterization of the issue determines
the nature of the scrutiny courts should exercise in examining
agency decisions. Along the spectrum of judicial investigation, the
more factual the agency decision, the narrower the scope of review
will be. Conversely, the more closely the agency determination
resembles a legal issue, the more liberal the scope of review will be.
Specifically, factual determinations are reviewed only when arbi-
trary or capricious'" while legal determinations made by agencies
are given de novo review.2 The standard applied for mixed ques-
tions varies.2 2
Under the traditional APA analysis, courts must therefore de-
termine where along the factual-legal spectrum the various issues
arising under NEPA lie. In general, delegating to the agency the
initial identification of actions with a significant environmental
impact acknowledges that the determination is discretionary, that
it is the agency's function to analyze and apply the facts, and that
judicial review will thus be narrow. Conversely, to argue that com-
plete review is required implies that interpreting significant impact
is a matter of statutory construction and therefore purely legal in
nature. It is also important to consider whether the case arises under
section 101 or 102,3 and whether the issue concerns the sufficiency
to the law-fact distinction) with L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 592-
94 (1965). Notwithstanding the differing analyses of these two authors, they both conclude
that the proper standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact is "reasonableness."
20. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.
1972); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344, 349 (D. Conn. 1972).
21. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972); Goose
Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
22. The rational basis test, also characterized as a reasonableness standard has attracted
the widest following. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). But see
Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958) (applying an arbitrary and capricious test
to mixed questions); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972).
Professor Davis states that in reality "[i]n reviewing administrative action ... a court
always has power to decide questions of law and . . . to a great extent a court has power to
convert questions of discretion and questions of fact into questions of law by making law
about them." K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 554.
23. Compare Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (substantive decisions made pursuant to § 101 totally within discretion of agency
and reviewing courts probably cannot reverse unless the action was arbitrary or clearly gave
insufficient weight to environmental values); Pennsylvania Environmental Council, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971) with S.I.P.I. v.
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of the EIS, the substantive decision of the agency, or a threshold
determination. 4
B. Sufficiency of the EIS
Attacks on the sufficiency of an EIS come under the procedural
mandates of section 102. The sufficiency of the statement is mea-
sured by the extent to which it analyzes and considers the action's
adverse environmental impacts, possible alternative courses of ac-
tion, the relationship between short-term and long-range effects,
and whether there are irreversible commitments of resources. 5 As
previously suggested, the scope of review for sufficiency challenges
tends to be more searching because agency discretion is often per-
ceived to be sharply limited by section 102.5 For example, the D.C.
Circuit has determined that a "hard look"27 must be given when
testing the adequacy of an EIS. The court's scrutiny, however, is
considerate of the realities of agency preparation.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,28 the
court reasoned that consistent with section 102(2)(c) of NEPA an
agency need not make an analysis of the environmental effects of
remote and speculative alternatives.29 However, the assessment
should include a list of opposing views as well as agency views °.3 Not
surprisingly, standards more restrictive than the "hard look" test
AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (decision not to file EIS made pursuant to procedural §
102 not discretionary and reviewable) and note 8 supra.
24. Professor Davis identifies five factors which he feels are important to a judge in
determining to review what are in reality discretionary administrative decisions. While these
factors are not articulated in formal written opinions they are probably considerations which
are given great weight by judges. These factors are: "[the] comparative qualifications of
courts and of agencies, the quality of the particular agency, judicial impressions of the
thoroughness and expertness of the administrative handling of the particular case, the extent
to which the agency is exercising power that has been especially delegated to it and withheld
or withdrawn from the courts, and whether or not lawmaking by the courts is needed or
appropriate in the particular case." K. DAvIS, supra note 18, at 552.
25. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 6-8 supra and accompanying text.
27. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This is also characterized as the
"rule of reason."
28. Id.
29. Id. at 834-38. The court thus clearly recognizes that agency resources are not infinite
and that there are limitations on the demands of NEPA.
30. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd




have been applied in cases attacking EIS sufficiency. Thus, the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard is sometimes invoked.3
C. Substantive Decision
Attacks on an agency's decision to go ahead with or approve an
action or project as opposed to the sufficiency of the EIS are judged
within the framework of section 101 of NEPA, the substantive sec-
tion. Under this section judicial inquiry will generally be limited to
a determination of whether or not there has been a proper balancing
of environmental factors with other relevant considerations.
Much greater deference will be granted such agency determina-
tions because of their discretionary nature, and out of respect for
agency expertise. Thus, the scope of review will be narrower than
in the case of EIS sufficiency questions.
Judicial respect for substantive agency decisions is evident
from the scope of review standards adopted by the courts in analyz-
ing such decisions. These tests range from allowing a very narrow
review of substantive agency decisions," to following a reasonable-
ness approach,33 with intermediate standards including arbitrari-
ness34 and good faith.3 1
D. Threshold Determinations of Significant Impact
Judicial inconsistency in construing NEPA is perhaps nowhere
more readily apparent than with regard to judicial determination of
the proper scope of review to be applied to agency threshold deter-
minations of whether a proposed action will significantly affect the
quality of the human environment.
31. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.
Ct. 2718 (1976); E.D.F. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d
1282 (lst Cir. 1973).
32. National Helium Corp. v. Morton (1), 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
33. National Helium Corp. v. Morton (II), 486 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 993 (1974); cf., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975).
34. Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (not reviewable unless arbitrary).
35. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); E.D.F. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1972) (good faith objectivity in balancing competing interests); City of New York
v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 929, 940 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974). Judge Leventhal
argues for more than subjective good faith. He would require that there be substantial evi-
dence to support the decision and that it be within a "zone of reasonableness." Id. at 529.
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Ironically, however, this is where certainty is most needed be-
cause an improper negative threshold determination by an agency
in the first instance thwarts NEPA's broad purposes by failing to
disclose the environmental hazards of a proposed action. In addi-
tion, it denies the public and the courts the benefits of a reviewable
environmental record which would reveal whether, and to what ex-
tent, the agency considered environmental values in making its de-
cision. NEPA's most effective safeguard could thus be easily
evaded.
As with other scope of review questions, the distinction between
law and fact is of primary importance in review of threshold deter-
minations. The more the decision is factual or discretionary, the
more restricted will be the scope of review. Conversely, the more the
issue resembles one of law, the wider the scope of review will be.
Given the amorphous nature of the statutory phrase "major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" and its attendant susceptibility to a broad spectrum of
interpretations, it is not surprising that as many as five different
standards for scope of review of threshold determinations can be
identified.37 The five standards follow.
1. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
In Hanly v. Kleindienst," the Second Circuit decided that the
proper scope of review to be applied to the General Services Admin-
istration's (GSA) decision not to file an EIS for the construction of
a Metropolitan Correction Center was the APA's arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard. In analyzing the issue the court acknowledged
the mixed character of the question by concluding that
[t]he action involves both a question of law-the meaning of the
word "significantly" in the statutory phrase "significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment"-and a question of
36. Judicial attempts to define the statutory phrase "significant impact" have thus far
not been enlightening. For a discussion of the judicially developed tests see section V, B, infra.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Guidelines would require an environmental
impact statement where the impact is potential, controversial or reasonably anticipated in
light of cumulative actions. 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-25 (1971). See notes 78-81 infra and accompa-
nying text.
37. An analysis of suits alleging agency impropriety in filing an EIS reveals a great deal
about the role judges feel the courts should play in connection with NEPA.
38. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
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fact-whether the MCC will have a "significantly" adverse envi-
ronmental impact."
Notwithstanding its recognition of the traditional judicial function
of de novo review for questions of law as well as the availability of
the "rational basis" standard for mixed questions of law and fact,"
the court opted for the arbitrary and capricious test citing the Su-
preme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe42 as authority.
Insofar as the court applied the arbitrary and capricious test to
a self-acknowledged question of mixed fact and law its choice repre-
sents a departure from traditional administrative law doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Hanly court rationalized this approach by stating
that
in some cases a complete de novo analysis of the legal questions,
though theoretically possible, may be undesirable for the reason
that the agency's determination reflects the exercise of expertise
not possessed by the court. 43
This result is questionable, however, because the court's reli-
ance on Overton Park appears misplaced. Subsequent decisions
have more accurately interpreted Overton Park to require a broader
scope of review for agency threshold decisions than the arbitrary and
capricious standard apparently embraced by the Supreme Court.4
Moreover, the Hanly court's deference to administrative expertise,
39. Id. at 828.
40. Id., citing APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970) and K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 29.01 (1958).
41. 471 F.2d at 829, citing NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
42. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). This case involved a suit brought to enjoin the Secretary of
Transportation from building a highway through the center of a city park. While Overton
Park expressly adheres to the arbitrary and capricious test, it impliedly calls for a much
broader review by directing courts to "consider whether the decision was based on a consider-
ation of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. at
416. Moreover, although there is a presumption that the agency acted with regularity, "that
presumption is not to shield his [the Secretary of Transportation's] action from a thorough,
probing, in-depth review." Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
43. 471 F.2d at 829, citing Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 441 (1958); see also
Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412 (1951).
44. Leventhal, supra note 35, at 513; 60 GEO. L. J. 1101, 1112, (1972); Note, The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAuv. L. REV. 40, 315-16 (1971); Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 522, 535 (1973);
Maryland - Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d
1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
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under the circumstances, would seem to be similarly questionable 5
in light of the limited deference granted it by Judge Leventhal of
the D.C. Circuit.
In the exercise of the court's supervisory function, full allowance
must be given for the reality that agency matters typically in-
volve a kind of expertise-"sometimes technical in a scientific
sense, sometimes more a matter of specialization in kinds of regu-
latory programs." Nevertheless, the court must study the record
attentively, even the evidence on technical and specialist mat-
ters, "to penetrate to the underlying decisions of the agency, to
satisfy itself that the agency has exercised a reasoned discretion
with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable
legislative intent.""
Nevertheless, both Hanly and Overton Park have been cited
frequently by courts who likewise apply the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 7
2. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
The substantial evidence formula for governing the scope of
judicial review is, in the field of administrative law, widely applied.
In the context of NEPA, however, this test has not been enthusiasti-
cally received. It is a restrictive test, permitting limited judicial
scrutiny.
This test was first applied in the environmental area in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC.15 The rationale cited for
the rule is that the court's function is "only 'to determine whether
there has been substantial compliance with applicable procedures
and statutes, and not to review the administrative determination as
45. Judge Leventhal has commented: "The role of the courts in environmental matters
is signficantly shaped . . . by whether the agency or official under review is one whose
primary function is or is not environmentally oriented." Leventhal, supra note 35, at 515. This
approach would seem to demand more searching review in the majority of cases as the role
of most agencies is only secondarily environmentally oriented. See note 66 infra and accompa-
nying text.
46. Leventhal, supra note 35, at 511, citing Greater Boston Televison Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
47. Echo Park v. Romney, 3 E.R.C. 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353
F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1973).
48. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). It is of limited import-
ance however, both because it has failed to attract any judicial converts and because it
predates the enactment of NEPA.
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to the wisdom or good judgment of the agency in exercising its
discretion.' "" Given the clear mandate of NEPA, that its provisions
be carried out to "the fullest extent possible," the test is ill-suited
only for the resolution of negative threshold determinations.'" Argu-
ably, in the context of NEPA, the substantial evidence test is not
applicable at all. In Overton Park the Supreme Court expressed the
view that the substantial evidence rule is only applicable to admin-
istrative determinations which are made on the basis of an agency
hearing.5 ' Under NEPA there is no hearing and no record required,
as such, from which one can determine whether an agency's thresh-
old determinations are supported by substantial evidence.
3. RATIONAL BASIS
Under this test the court will affirm agency action if it has a
rational basis.5" This test is applied by examining the record to see
if there is a rational basis for the agency determination. It is thus
closely related to the substantial evidence rule and therefore shares
many of the same problems when applied to NEPA threshold deter-
minations. It is particularly deficient as a tool for understanding
NEPA in that its use inevitably leads to a discussion of the law-fact
distinction and subsumes the real issue,53 which is the amount of
49. Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969). In Charlton, the court specifi-
cally rejected the substantial evidence test and its rationale.
50. Its chief shortcoming from the standpoint of the environmentalist is that it "virtually
precludes the possibility of a judgment for a plaintiff on the merits, due to the potentially
vast documentary resources of an administrative agency." NEPA Reasonableness, supra note
13, at 120.
51. 401 U.S. at 414.
52. The rational basis test had its genesis in NLRB v. Hearst Publishing Inc., 322 U.S.
111 (1944) and Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
53. NEPA Reasonableness, supra note 13 at 122:
The inherent subtlety of the law-fact distinction renders the reasonable basis test,
as traditionally applied to mixed questions, difficult to use in reviewing threshold
determinations. After judicial determination that an issue embodies questions of
law and fact, a court's resolution of the relevant law need not be determinative,
because a court can permit an agency's factual finding to stand. Further, although
the test affords some freedom for appellate review, the reasonable basis standard
attaches as a condition subsequent to judicial identification of a mixed question,
foreclosing an opportunity for greater judicial latitude on a question of law alone.
However, wielded by appellate courts, application of that standard necessarily
entails embroilment in the law-fact controversy, and thereby fails to resolve the
confusion surrounding the assessment of a threshold decision under section
102(2)(C) (footnotes omitted).
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discretion administrators should have under the mandate of
NEPA.54 Nevertheless, the rational basis test permits a somewhat
broader judicial review of administrative decisions and therefore has
been adopted by a number of courts and commentators.55
4. REASONABLENESS
Of the tests which acknowledge that there is some agency dis-
cretion involved, the reasonableness test has the most followers.5"
The rationale advanced for adopting the reasonableness test as op-
posed to the arbitrary and capricious standard was clearly stated in
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger:57 "The spirit of [NEPA] would die
aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or
did not significantly affect the environment were too well shielded
from impartial review.""
There is scholarly support for application of a broader scope of
review than the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard even where
the administrative action is admittedly in part discretionary. Pro-
fessor Jaffe, for example, proposes that courts limit agency discre-
tion where statutory intent would so require.59 Congress' directive
that NEPA be followed "to the fullest extent possible" would evi-
dence sufficient intent to so narrowly define the range of agency
discretion."0
It is not altogether clear how this test differs, if at all, from the substantial evidence test.
See notes 56-60 infra and accompanying text.
54. Scope of review is the wrong vehicle by which to insure the consideration of environ-
mental values. See discussion infra, section IV.
55. See, e.g., S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 53 B.U.L. REV. 879,
896 (1973).
56. See M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinat-
ing Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476
F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Scherr
v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). NEPA
Reasonableness, supra note 13. Cf. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973); see also
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
Many of the courts adopting the reasonableness test limit the discretion exercised by the
agency chief to determining only whether NEPA applies at all. Even then, the agency must*
make a good faith judgment. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484
F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973).
57. 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 466.
59. L. JAFFE, supra note 19, at 572. "Discretion ... is not self-defining; it does not arise
parenthetically from 'broad' phrases. Its contour is determined by the courts, which must
define its scope and its limits." Id. (emphasis added).
60. See note 8 supra.
[Vol. 31:71
NEPA
5. DE NOVO REVIEW
Some courts hold that there is no discretion whatever to be
exercised by administrators and therefore a de novo review of a
threshold determination is appropriate." The rationale stated for
this position is that the meaning of "significant environmental
impact" is a question of statutory construction and as such is a
judicial function.
I-[. EXPLANATION OF COURT DIVERSITY UNDER "SCOPE OF REVIEW
ANALYSIS"
The standards for review of agency threshold determinations
under NEPA thus range from very limited review (based on a find-
ing of maximum agency discretion) to complete review (founded on
the belief that there is no discretion to be exercised by administra-
tors whatsoever)."2
Underlying judicial application of an expanded scope of review
is the notion that environmental concerns cannot be trusted to ad-
ministrative agencies which, NEPA notwithstanding, have as their
primary goal the advancement of other interests. 3 Indeed, "[iut is
the premise of NEPA that environmental matters are likely to be
61. See National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Parker v.
United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Kaibab Industries v.
Parker, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Rhode Island Comm. Energy v. GSA, 397 F. Supp. 41 (D.R.I.
1975); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp.
886 (W.D. Wisc. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). It is the reviewing court's function
to determine de novo all questions of law. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). See also K.
DAVIS, supra note 18 at § 28.05.
62. Note that some courts have adopted the position that when an agency determines
that no EIS is required, it must file a statement indicating why an EIS is unnecessary. This
has been characterized as a negative impact statement. See, e.g., Arizona Public Serv. Co.
v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973); S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also EPA Interim Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. No. 11 at 1699 (1973), amending 40
CFR § 6.25(a) (1972).
63. See Developments in Environmental Law, 3 ENV. L. REP. 50001, 50003 (1973), where
it is asserted:
[Flor the most part the agencies which must do the "full good faith" balancing
of economic and social costs against environmental costs are generally structured
to be advocates for economic expansion. As long as agencies are left to do the
balancing, and so long as they have a dual mandate of environmental protection
and economic development in their particular field-for example, power growth
for the FPC, nuclear development for the AEC, or flood containment for the Army
Corps of Engineers-is not the environment bound to come out on the short end?
(emphasis in original).
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of secondary concern to agencies whose primary missions are non-
environmental."6 4
NEPA demands that environmental values be given equal sta-
tus with economic and social values.65 Indeed, the rights protected
under NEPA have been elevated to near constitutional propor-
tions. "
The importance of the rights protected by NEPA is only one
factor, however, in analyzing why courts have found it necessary to
carefully scrutinize agency threshold determinations. Other consid-
erations are also at work, although they are not necessarily as ob-
vious.
Agencies do not always have the necessary expertise available
to make informed environmental decisions. 7 While it is true that
NEPA commands agencies to utilize a "systematic interdisciplinary
approach" to decisionmaking and to solicit the assistance of other
federal agencies, deference should not be given to such expertise
unless it is in fact the basis of that decision. The fact that NEPA
directs agencies to seek or develop the expertise that they lack does
not mean that they will do so. 6
64. Leventhal, supra note 35, at 515. Given this premise it is clear that the review
required to safeguard NEPA's objectives must be conducted by an institution that is "inde-
pendent" in the sense that it is not caught up in the agency's mission as its reason for being
and basis for succeeding. Id. See notes 45 & 63, supra. See also Substantive Review, supra
note 2, at 757. See generally A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 237, 242 (1967).
65. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
66. E.D.F. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971):
[C]ourts are increasingly asked to review administrative action that touches on
fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty. These interests have
always had a special claim to judicial protection, in comparison with . ..
economic interests ....
(emphasis added). See also Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1039 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizen Suits, supra note 5;
Klipsch, Aspects of A Constitutional Right to a Habitable Environment: Towards an Envi-
ronmental Due Process, 49 IND. L.J. 203 (1974).
67. See generally Citizen Suits, supra note 5; Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental
Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 629 (1970). More-
over, judges are relatively more expert at interpreting statutory language than are administra-
tive agencies. L. JAFFEE, supra note 19, at 613.
The role of the courts should in particular, be viewed hospitably where . ..the
question sought to be reviewed does not significantly engage the agency's
expertise. . [w.. Where the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning
of the statutory term," . . . [the dispute] presents issues on which courts, and
not [administrators] are relatively more expert.
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).




Time constraints may foreclose the necessary search for the
required expert opinion mandated. Indeed, Judge Leventhal argues
that even when the agency consults an expert, there should be no
more than a reasoned deference to agency expertise. 9 Moreover,
agencies often become carried away with their own abilities and
defiantly refuse to comply with laws which they feel might hinder
their operation. 0 They may seek to insulate themselves from the law
and judicial scrutiny, hiding behind the shield of expertise and a
self-proclaimed autonomy.
It has been argued that judicial review will improve the quality
of agency decisionmaking and insure that the broad goals of NEPA
will thus be realized." In addition, the currently popular theory that
regulatory agencies have been "captured" by the industries which
they regulate" may be shared by the courts. Perhaps, subtly ac-
knowledging the capture notion, Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C.
Circuit has stated:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of the long
and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies and review-
ing courts. For many years, courts have treated administrative
policy decisions with great deference, confining judicial attention
primarily to matters of procedure. On matters of substance, the
courts regularly upheld agency action, with a nod in the direction
of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of
administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less
often exercised, the power to set aside agency action on the
ground that an impermissible factor had entered into the deci-
69. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
70. See Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. GSA, 397 F. Supp. 41, 58 (D.R.I. 1975) (court
found utter disregard of environmental considerations in spite of knowledge of the environ-
mental significance of a nuclear power plant); Comment, Four Years of Environmental Im-
pact Statements: A Review of Agency Administration of NEPA, 8 AKRON L. REV. 545 (1975).
"[Flor the last 10 years the (AEC) has purposefully concealed information about the dangers
of nuclear power plants for which it has issued both construction and operation permits." Id.
at 559, citing, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1975, § 1, at 1, Col. 1.
71. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1973); E.D.F. v. Ruckelshaus,
439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971); K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 524. But see, Voigt, The
National Environmental Policy Act and the Independent Regulatory Agency: Some Unre-
solved Conflicts, 5 NATURAL RES. LAWYER 13, 22 (1972) (arguing that close judicial supervision
will cripple the administrative process); 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1042, 1055 (1972) (fearing that
environmental priorities will be left in the hands of a judicial elite).
72. See 58 VA. L. REV. 177, 186 (1972): "To those who believe that federal agencies tend
to protect the industries they are supposed to regulate, it may seem anomalous and self-
defeating to charge these agencies with the primary duty to protect the environment."
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sion, or a crucial factor had not been considered. Gradually, how-
ever, that power has come into more frequent use, and with it,
the requirement that administrators articulate the factors on
which they base their decisions."
With regard to scope of review generally, it is naive to assume
that courts determine the proper scope based upon whether they
find the issue involved to be legal or factual. It is submitted that
more often than not, courts attach the law or fact label after they
have determined what scope of review to employ.74
While this judicial technique may lead to equitable results it
also leads to confusion. Expansion of the scope of review doctrine is
thus a poor foundation on which to base a framework for analysis
of NEPA's threshold determination or by which to insure that
NEPA's goals will be realized.75
IV. SOLUTION: JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST
The scope of review approach does not reach the root of the
problem-defining "significant impact." It is in fact largely irrele-
vant which standard of review is utilized by the courts. Will the well
meaning administrator be better able to determine that an EIS is
required knowing that the standard for reviewing his decision is
73. E.D.F. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted). This
increased use of judicial power is further evidenced by the expanding notions of standing and
reviewability. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (standing); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (reviewability).
74. In truth, the distinction between "questions of law" and "questions of
fact" really gives little help in determining how far the courts will review; and
for the good reason that there is no fixed distinction. They are not two mutually
exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter. Matters
of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach upward without
a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage
at the point where the court chooses to draw the line between public interest and
private right. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to review, they
are tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question one of "fact";
and when otherwise disposed, they say that it is a question of "law."
J. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 55
(1927).
75. Some commentators have suggested that the solution can be found in the establish-
ment of an environmental court, Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental
Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473, 489 (1973), or by abdicating to Congress the task
of providing the proper scope of review for environmental cases. Comment, The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969: A Step in the Right Direction, 26 ARK. L. REV. 209, 224
(1972).
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whether it was arbitrary and capricious or whether it was reason-
able? Similarly, will courts assist in clarifying the statutory lan-
guage of NEPA by adjudging an administrator's actions unreason-
able?
Application of an expanded scope of review is perhaps a deter-
rent" and sometimes a remedy" but it is not a guide which will
facilitate administrative decisionmaking in the first instance. More
importantly it will not promote the consideration of environmental
values at the administrative agency level where Congress clearly
intended NEPA's goals to be implemented.
The trend toward expanded scope of review in NEPA cases, as
evidenced by a partial judicial abandonment of the arbitrary and
capricious standard, implicitly acknowledges that administrators
are perceived to have little, if any discretion under the statute. Even
if they do have discretion, the courts will limit or closely monitor
its use. If this be the case, the administrator's function in threshold
determinations is essentially ministerial. Performance of ministerial
duties requires a reasonably clear standard which so far neither
Congress, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)5 nor the
courts have provided.
Judicial adoption of a comprehensive test9 which would aid
agency decisionmaking would in no way inhibit a court's ability to
utilize existing scope of review analysis to invalidate improper
agency action.'" It might have the added benefit of eliminating from
76. But see note 72 supra and accompanying text.
77. Review will still occur in those situations where agency action is challenged. When
it remains unchallenged NEPA will have failed.
78. The CEQ guidelines are vague and without the force of law. Compare Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) with Citizens
for Clean Air Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
79. "When legislative bodies delegate discretionary power without meaningful stan-
dards, administrators should develop standards at the earliest feasible time, and then, as
circumstances permit, should further confine their own discretion through principles and
rules." K. DAVIS, supra note 18, at 55, citing Fook Hong Mak v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir. 1970).
It is submitted that where administrators either refuse or are unable to adopt meaningful
standards which would fulfill the relevant statutory intent, then the courts should adopt
standards to guide the administrators, rather than foster confusion by ad hoc decisionmaking.
What should be adopted is not a standard of review for the courts but a standard of compli-
ance which administrators and courts alike can utilize effectively.
80. To reduce the scope of review problem in threshold determination analysis, it is
suggested that failure to utilize the test proposed herein would be arbitrary and capricious.
This would eliminate the need to apply a more liberal scope of review to investigate an
administrator's action since his action would not comport with even the strictest standard.
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the court's docket those close cases which heretofore required judi-
cial intervention and remedial action. The net result would be a
more widespread and thorough consideration of environmental val-
ues accompanied by a saving of judicial labor. An ancillary and
welcome benefit would be the development of a body of more intelli-
gible law under NEPA.
V. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS
A. Judicial Determinations
In order to develop a comprehensive test based on statutory
interpretation of the policy and goals behind NEPA, a list of envi-
ronmental factors or meaningful guidelines to be considered in de-
termining whether a proposed action will significantly affect the
environment" must be set forth. Because of the almost complete
lack of Congressional and administrative leadership in this task, it
is necessary to look to the decisions of the federal courts for guid-
ance, as they have almost exclusively carried this burden.2 In the 7
years since the enactment of NEPA, a wide variety of factual situa-
tions have been found to produce a significant impact upon the
environment. Some have been obvious, such as highway construc-
tion83 and the taking of parklands through eminent domain,84 while
others, such as the ICC's approval of railroad surcharges on all
freight including recyclables,85 and technology research and devel-
opment programs directed toward creating new nuclear power
plants in the future," have not.
81. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Note, National Environmental Policy Act - Procedural Requirements Applica-
ble to the Threshold Agency Determination that an Environmental Impact Statement Is Not
Required; Tests for Actions Constituting "Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the
Quality of the Human Environment," 26 S.C.L. REv. 119 (1974).
83. See, e.g., Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (converting a conventional
two-lane highway into a four-lane freeway); Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972)
(construction of interstate highway segment through mountain camping area); Arlington
Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972)
(construction of six to eight lane highway).
84. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972);
TVA v. Three Tracts of Land, Etc., 377 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Businessmen Affected
Severely by the Yearly Action Plans, Inc. (BASYAP) v. D.C. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793
(D.D.C. 1972).
85. SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C.), stay of injunction denied sub
nom. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972), rev'd on other grounds,
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
86. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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In order to make these determinations, the courts have consid-
ered an equally wide range of factors. Judicial analysis has not
stopped at mere considerations of increases in water and air pollu-
tion, 7 but has extended to the evaluation of factors which affect the
urban environment as well, such as noise, crime, traffic congestion
and even the availability of drugs.8"
Nevertheless, the term "significantly," which triggers the im-
pact statement requirement, can be interpreted to mean anything
from "'not trivial' through 'appreciable' to 'important' and even
'momentous.' ""5 Although courts have generally gravitated toward
"the lower end of [this] spectrum,""0 attempts at precise definition
have produced nothing more helpful than an important or meaning-
ful effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of aspects of the
human environment." 9' Such mere reshuffling of words, however, is
of little help in making a threshold determination." Therefore, in
order to develop a meaningful framework of analysis to define those
actions which significantly affect the environment, it is necessary to
analyze the factual situations in which the courts have found a
significant impact and the factors they have considered in making
these determinations.
1. THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
As might well be expected, the great majority of cases constru-
ing NEPA's impact statement requirement have concerned agency
actions directly93 affecting the natural environment. Thus, a host of
decisions exist considering the environmental impact of actions
87. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972); Trinity
Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), modified, 523 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974).
88. Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972); McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F.
Supp. 221, 246 (D. Mo. 1975).
89. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 837 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id.
91. N.R.D.C. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
92. See Karp, NEPA: Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the Quality of the
Human Environment, 11 AM. Bus. L.J. 209, 224 (1974).
93. Subsection VI, B, 3 infra will deal with the question of agency actions indirectly
affecting the environment. These are actions of the agency which do not in themselves affect
the environment, but which allow others to affect the environment, such as where an agency
grants a private company a license to log a forest or mine government lands. The aspects of
these decisions which deal with effects upon the natural environment shall be discussed in
this subsection.
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such as highway projects," eminent domain proceedings, 5 logging
operations,"6 channelization projects, 7 harbor dredgings, 5 dam con-
struction,9" grazing,'00 herbicide spraying,'"' wildlife refuge fund-
ing,'02 insect control,' 3 and even Navy amphibious landing drills.'0 4
While many of these cases merely come to the obvious conclusion
that a significant impact either does or does not exist because of the
immediate facts of its particular circumstances, several provide an
94. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) (project involving conversion of two-
lane conventional highway into fourlane freeway); Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.
1972) (construction of an interstate highway in mountain camping area); Arlington Coalition
on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972) (construction
of six to eight-lane highway); Barta v. Brinegar, 358 F. Supp. 1025 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (pro-
posed highway segment through marshland areas); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W.
Va. 1079) (completion of one-lane forest road); Conservation Society v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp.
761 (D. Vt. 1072), aff'd sub nom. Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927
(2d Cir. 1974) (highway widening project).
95. Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972)
(taking of 11 acres of park land in a thickly settled city constituted a significant impact);
TVA v. Three Tracts of Land, Etc., 377 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (acquisition of land,
itself, by TVA through eminent domain did not constitute a significant impact regardless of
proposed use).
96. M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (logging constituted a significant
impact); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973)
(harvesting of timber constituted a significant impact); Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382
F. Supp. 362 (D.D.C. 1974) (no significant impact was created by a federal program "setting
aside" certain lumber for small businesses before being made available to larger ones because
it would not change either the manner or volume of timber harvested, but merely the question
of who did the harvesting).
97. N.R.D.C. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (project involving 66 miles of
channelization significantly affected the environment).
98. Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn. 1972) (dredging of a harbor and
the proposed offshore dumping of more than 1,000,000 tons of materials containing pollutants
in excess of guidelines promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency significantly
affected the environment).
99. Concerned Residents v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (likelihood that
environmental effects from project will be significant and findings of the Soil Conservation
Service that lead to negative impact statement do not justify contrary conclusion).
100. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (significant impact found).
101. Wisconsin v. Butz, 389 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (proposed spraying of herbi-
cides in national forests to "release" pine seedlings from competition with other vegetation
significantly affected the environment).
102. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976) (annual budget proposal of approxi-
mately $200,000,000 for financing National Wildlife Refuge System consisting of 350 refuges,
containing 30,000,000 acres significantly affected the environment).
103. E.D.F. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971) (program to control imported
fire ants in Southeast United States constituted a significant impact upon the environment).




analysis of environmental factors which are equally relevant in other
situations where the impact upon the natural environment is under
consideration.
Thus, in Scherr v. Volpe, °5 which involved the conversion of a
conventional two-lane highway into a four-lane freeway, the court
concluded that because the project would result in damage to the
natural habitats of various wild animals, strip forested land, in-
crease levels of noise, air and water pollution, and impinge upon the
natural beauty and recreational value of the area,' 6 it would signifi-
cantly affect the natural environment.
While these same factors have been considered in a great num-
ber of cases analyzing effects upon the natural environment, °"
courts have also looked to a variety of other factors as well, such as
pre-existing uses of the area,0 8 the permanency of the adverse envi-
ronmental effects,' 9 accompanying restoration plans"0 and effects
upon the geological, historical and archeological characteristics of
the area."'
105. 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
106. Id. at 1033.
107. M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (logging would create an excess
nutrient run-off which would cause algae growth in lakes and streams affecting water purity);
Concerned Residents v. Grant, 388 F. Supp. 394 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (proposed dam would
change temperature of water possibly affecting the habitat of fish); Smith v. City of Cooke-
ville, 381 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (loss of wildlife); Barta v. Brinegar, 358 F. Supp.
1025 (W.D. Wis. 1973) (proposed highway would affect nesting areas, food and shelter for
waterfowl and other wildlife); Kisner v. Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972) (comple-
tion of one-lane gravel mountain road would not significantly affect water, air, or noise
pollution); N.R.D.C. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (channelization project
would result in reduction of fish population and loss of wetland habitat).
108. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) (construction of fishing pier would
not significantly affect the environment where several already were in existence); Kisner v.
Butz, 350 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.W. Va. 1972) (completion of one-lane gravel mountain road
which was part of an overall roadway system in area used for 30 years would not significantly
affect the environment); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(introduction of stretch jets into Washington's national airport would not significantly affect
the environment because of minimal impact over normal jets already using the airport). For
further discussion of this factor see subsection VI, B, 4 infra.
109. M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (effects of erosion caused by
logging would remain visible for as long as 100 years).
110. Id. (court considered the fact that money received by agency for issuing logging
receipt would not be adequate to finance a reforestation program).
111. Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified,
484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973) (court required an environmental assessment in light of these
factors); Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972)
(court considered historical value in restraining Boston Redevelopment Authority from demo-
lition plans).
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In short, courts have generally effectuated the congressional
intent behind NEPA by recognizing that the decisionmaker's task
is not to merely total up dollars-and-cents costs and injuries to the
environment in a profit-ledger type of analysis, but rather to give
attention to the previously unconsidered ecological effects of an
action to both present and future generations and to decide whether
the depletion of irreplaceable natural resources should proceed in
the manner suggested." 2
2. THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
The scope of NEPA, however, is not merely limited to the pro-
tection of the natural environment. Rather, it "must be construed
to include protection of the quality of life for city residents ... "I"
and consequently, the Act is equally concerned with effects upon the
so-called urban environment."'
This concern for the urban environment as such was first fully
developed in Hanly v. Mitchell (Hanly I),"' where the Second Cir-
cuit upheld the GSA's threshold decision that the addition of a 12-
story office building to an existing government complex in Man-
hattan would not significantly affect the environment, but rejected
a similar conclusion by the agency with regard to an accompanying
detention facility containing planned community prisoner release
and drug rehabilitation programs.
Although consideration by the agency of the availability of util-
ities, the adequacy of mass transportation, the removal of trash, the
absence of a relocation problem and the intention to comply with
existing zoning ordinances was deemed sufficient to make a thresh-
old determination concerning the proposed office building, the court
held that it was not sufficient to make such a determination con-
cerning the detention facilities. Noting that although NEPA con-
tains no exhaustive list of so-called environmental considerations,
the court concluded that it nevertheless extends beyond sewage and
garbage concerns and even beyond increases in water and air pollu-
112. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 96 S.Ct.
2718 (1976).
113. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d
640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972).
114. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640
(2d Cir. 1972).
115. 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tion to include considerations of factors which affect the urban envi-
ronment, such as noise, traffic, overburdened mass transportation
systems, crime, congestion and even the availability of drugs. Thus,
it was held that the GSA should have considered the possibility of
riots and disturbances in the jail to which neighbors might be ex-
posed, the dangers of crime accompanying the drug rehabilitation
program and possible traffic and parking problems that would be
increased by the functioning of the facility."6
A second assessment statement by the GSA was also held to be
insufficient to support its determination with regard to the proposed
detention facility in Hanly v. Kleindienst (Hanly II)."1 Although the
agency considered the location, proposed use, design features, en-
ergy demands and transportation and pollution effects of the facil-
ity, the court concluded that the GSA's repeated failure to evaluate
the possibilities that it would increase the risk of crime in the imme-
diate area and endanger the safety of neighbors"' was fatal to the
agency's threshold determination.
A number of other factors have also been stressed by various
decisions considering the effect of proposed agency actions upon the
urban environment. These factors have included population density
and distribution,"9 deteriorating neighborhood influences, 20 the
destruction of historical landmarks, 2' alterations in the character of
neighborhoods, 2 loss of existing view from adjoining properties, 23
and aesthetics.' 2 Courts have generally resisted inclusion of socio-
116. Id.
117. 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
118. The court was especially concerned with the possibility that the facility would
endanger the safety of neighbors by exposing them to drug addicts taking part in the out-
patient treatment facility and pushers and others who would necessarily frequent the vicinity
of drug maintenance centers.
119. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
120. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). See note 127
infra and accompanying text.
121. Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n, Inc. v. Romney, 343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass.
1972).
122. B.A.S.Y.A.P. v. D.C. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972); Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
123. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
124. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Kleindienst, 382 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. 11. 1973); Town of Groton
v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972).
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economic factors,' 5 however, such as the influx of low income work-
ers' 26 or the alleged anti-social propensities of low income persons
and the resulting fears which their increasing presence might engen-
der, as proper factors to be considered under NEPA.' 27
Where agencies have properly considered these factors, the
courts have generally upheld their threshold determinations, such
as in the case of housing projects' 28 and even detention facilities' 29
similar to that in Hanly. But where agencies have failed to give due
weight to these factors, the courts have been quick to reject agency
125. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
modified, 523 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1975).
126. Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
But see Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972) (consideration of socio-
economic factors).
127. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Service,
487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), the
court noted that "although human beings may be polluters . . . they are not themselves
pollution." Id. at 149. The court did leave the door open for consideration of socio-economic
factors, however, by further stating that although the social and economic characteristics of
potential occupants of public housing, as such, are not relevant in determining whether the
program will significantly affect the environment, the consideration of whether acts resulting
from the social and economic characteristics of the potential occupants will create a signifi-
cant impact upon the environment, are proper.
Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), however,
apparently recognized the potential danger of abuse by using NEPA as a new weapon for the
practice of discrimination and flatly held that such factors are not objective criteria of impact
upon the human environment and therefore are not proper factors to be considered under
NEPA.
128. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Trinity Episco-
pal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Nucleus of Chicago Home-
owners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. I1. 1973); Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp.
344 (D. Conn. 1972).
129. First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Continental Ill. Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Kleindienst, 382 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. I1. 1973). In First Nat'l the court
upheld the GSA's threshold determination because the agency had considered the building's
conformity to building codes, the adequacy of existing utilities and waste facilities, aesthetics
and impacts upon traffic. Although adopting the two-pronged Hanly test, the court distin-
guished the GSA's failure to consider increases in crime from the Second Circuit's mandate
in Hanly on the grounds that the Chicago facility would not be near a residential area like
the New York project in Hanly. Rather, it would be located in the blighted Chicago "Loop"
area which was composed of deteriorating buildings, flophouses, adult bookstores, arcades,
liquor stores, taverns and non-resident commercial and office buildings. Furthermore, the
Chicago facility failed to contain a drug maintenance unit which would attract the addicts,
pushers and others which so disturbed the court in Hanly.
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Continental where the court placed great




determinations concerning the construction of high-rise buildings, 130
urban renewal projects, 3' shopping center developments, 32 and
even a railroad abandonment proceeding.13
Unfortunately, however,
the environmental problems of the city are not as readily identifi-
able as clean air and clean water . . . .Life in the inner city
embraces a range of environmental problems, some starkly evi-
dent, some disguised, some acknowledged as environmental,
some wearing other labels . . .. [Miany of our most severe
environmental problems interact with social and economic condi-
tions [in the inner city] which the Nation is also seeking to
improve . . . . [And thus] [t]he traditional environmental
objectives of clean air and water and preservation of national
parks . . . are not the central concerns of. . .[the] inner city.134
Nevertheless, these cases present the realization that the
"'[e]nvironment' means something more than rocks, trees, and
streams or the amount of air pollution .. .[Instead] [i]t encom-
passes all the factors that affect the quality of life . . . ,."I thereby
extending the reach of NEPA beyond merely the natural environ-
ment to include the urban environment as well.
3. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF AGENCY ACTIONS
Courts have given further effect to the broad policy considera-
tions behind NEPA by refusing to restrict the Act's application
merely to those effects upon the environment directly and actually
caused by the agency itself, but instead have construed NEPA's
impact statement requirement to include also those actions and
decisions taken by agencies which have allowed both the states and
private parties to take actions significantly affecting the environ-
ment.'36 Thus, courts have required impact statements by agencies
prior to their approval of grants and loans of federal funds for con-
130. Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
131. B.A.S.Y.A.P. v. D.C. City Council, 339 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1972).
132. Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. La. 1974).
133. City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The court
noted the potential for the increase in the use of alternate modes of transportation with their
correspondingly greater pollution effects.
134. First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484 F.2d at 1377-78 (7th Cir. 1973), quoting 2
Council on Environmental Quality Ann. Rep. 189-91 (Aug. 1971).
135. Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 591 (E.D. La. 1974).
136. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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struction programs,'37 logging leases,'38 grazing permits,'39 increases
in industry surcharges on freight,'40 and even funding proposals for
technology research and development programs.'
To reach this result, courts have examined the phrase "actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," and
have either construed the word "affecting" as referring to both di-
rect and indirect effects of an agency's action'42 or interpreted the
word "actions" to include not only actions taken by the agency
itself, but also actions (or decisions) of the agency which have al-
lowed others to act in a way which would significantly affect the
environment. "'
The logical extensions of this approach to defining the reach of
NEPA are best illustrated by the holdings in SCRAP v. United
States"' and Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc.
(S.I.P.I.) v. AEC."5 In SCRAP, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia held that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was required to submit an impact statement before it ap-
proved the railroad industry's implementation of a 2.5 percent sur-
charge on all railroad freight, because such a surcharge might dis-
courage the movement of recyclables. The court reasoned that since
the existing rate structure already discouraged the movement of
recyclables, every across-the-board increase would further decrease
incentives to recycling. This would in turn result in the increased
degradation of the natural environment by discarded, unrecycled
goods and the increased exploitation of scarce natural resources."'
137. Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974) (commitment to guarantee bond
obligations used to finance housing and urban development); Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d 1146
(2d Cir. 1973) (approval of loan application to finance a portion of construction costs to
expand paper machinery company); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (grant for
construction of medical and reception areas for prisoners).
138. M.P.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (logging lease).
139. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
140. SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C.), stay of injunction denied sub
nor. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. R. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972), rev 'd on other grounds,
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (ICC approval of railroad surcharge increases
on all freight including recyclables).
141. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (research and development programs
for nuclear reactors).
142. M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
143. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
144. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972).
145. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
146. 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972). Chief Justice Burger in chambers, subsequently
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The D.C. Circuit extended the concept of "indirect effects"
even further in S.I.P.I. by holding that the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's proposals for the funding of technology research and develop-
ment programs directed toward creating liquid metal fast breeder
reactors'47 constituted a significant environmental impact. The
court reasoned that such agency funded programs would create a
technology which would permit utility companies to take action
affecting the environment in the future by building such plants in
much the same way that an agency's decision to grant a construc-
tion permit to a builder would affect the environment. The court
further concluded that to postpone consideration of a technology's
possible adverse environmental effects until it reached the stage of
commercial feasibility would frustrate any meaningful considera-
tion of environmental costs, because technological advancements
are capital investments such that the investment of time and re-
sources in their development acts to compel their application once
they are brought to a stage of commercial feasibility.'48
Despite the broad scope of these decisions, however, the courts
have put some limitations on how "indirect" an action may be
before it can no longer be said to significantly affect the environ-
ment. Thus, courts have upheld agency determinations concluding
that no significant impact was created by a Federal Trade Commis-
sion decision to promulgate guidelines respecting vertical mergers
in the cement industry' and by the Comptroller of Currency's pre-
liminary approval of an application to organize a second national
bank which would finance urban developments that in turn would
refused the railroads' petition for a stay of the injunction granted by the district court pending
review by the entire Court, under the theory that an appellate court should not grant a stay
of an injunction by a lower court unless that court's action in granting the injunction was
"clearly erroneous." Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972).
147. Liquid metal fast breeder reactors are a highly fertile energy source which by the
year 2000 are expected to generate nearly one-fourth of our nation's electric power. This
anticipated large scale use, which is a result of its apparent technological and commercial
feasibility, will create complex problems regarding the handling and storing of large amounts
of radioactive wastes, site selections and accident prevention. Note, 87 H~Av. L. REV. 1050
(1974).
148. Although it has been suggested that a construction of S.I.P.I. to encompass all
research programs which would significantly affect the environment upon implementation is
too broad because of the lack of a sufficient nexus between the immediate research program
and any possible future environmental harms in most such programs, Note, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1050, 1053 (1974), this is really a problem concerning the "timing" of the threshold determina-
tion, which is discussed in detail in subsection VI, B, 5 infra.
149. Gifford-Hill & Co. v. FTC, 389 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1974).
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contribute to the urbanization of the area and a worsening ecological
crisis."50
Thus, the courts have realized that although the reach of NEPA
is clearly not unlimited, 5' its triggering phrase of "actions signifi-
cantly affecting the . . . environment" is intentionally broad in
order to reflect the Act's attempt to promote an across-the-board
adjustment in federal agency decisionmaking so as to make the
environment a concern of every federal agency,'52 and that to
implement this purpose the Act's application may not be limited
merely to those effects upon the environment directly and actually
caused by the agency itself. 5 '
4. EXISTING USES AND ZONING RESTRICTIONS
The reach of NEPA has been inadvertently restricted in several
instances where courts have given undue weight to the considera-
tions of whether a proposed action was in keeping with local zoning
ordinances or consistent with pre-existing uses of the area." 4
In Rucker v. Willis,'55 for example, the Fourth Circuit gave
scant consideration to the actual environmental effects of a pro-
posed fishing pier and boat basin to be built on part of North Caro-
lina's outerbanks and instead placed its reliance upon the fact that
the area was already host to several commercial fishing piers similar
to the one in dispute in holding that the action would not signifi-
cantly affect the environment.
Similarly, in Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission v. United States Postal Service,5 ' it was reasoned that
150. First Nat'l Bank v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1973). The court further
reasoned that the existence of strong local and state laws protecting the environment and the
new consciousness in environmental matters would intervene to prevent the bank from fi-
nancing a project which might cause ecological harm to the environment.
151. E.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972).
152. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp.
829 (D.D.C. 1974).
153. See S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
154. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) and Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), which develop a
two-pronged test to determine whether a project will significantly affect the environment, by
considering, in part, the existing uses of the area. The Hanly test however, prevents the giving
of undue weight to this factor by requiring the decisionmaker also to analyze the cumulative
effects of the proposed project.
155. 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973).
156. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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when local zoning ordinances are followed by a federal agency, there
is an assurance that the environmental effects resulting from such
land uses will be no greater than that demanded by the residents of
the locale acting through their elected representatives. Thus, con-
cluded the court, a presumption should arise that the effects of the
proposed action are insignificant for purposes of EIS analysis, when-
ever the agency action complies with such local land use restric-
tions.
These cases fail to recognize, however, that although existing
area uses and restrictions are clearly relevant factors to be consid-
ered in assessing whether a proposed agency action will significantly
affect the environment,"' undue reliance upon them shifts the focus
of analysis away from evaluating the actual environmental impact
of an action. Moreover, such uses and restrictions are not necessarily
made with the benefit of an impact statement or the federal
agency's available expertise nor under the mandate required by
NEPA to consider environmental factors. Thus, such local decisions
are not necessarily the product of informed or environmentally mo-
tivated decisionmaking.
NEPA was not intended to be a meta-zoning law nor was it
designed to enshrine existing zoning ordinances on the theory that
their violation presents a threat to the environment.'58 Furthermore,
the Act was not intended to be used by communities as an instru-
ment to shore up large lots and serve as another exclusionary zoning
device that prices out low and even middle income families.'59
5. TIMING'6" OF THE THRESHOLD DETERMINATION
Neither NEPA nor the CEQ guidelines provide any meaningful
assistance in determining the point in a project's lifetime at which
157. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
158. Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972). It should be noted,
however, that the court did give weight to the fact that the Navy's proposed use for the land
in question (i.e., a housing project) was nearly identical to the city's intended use.
159. Id.
160. The use of the word "timing" here refers to the timing of the threshold decision of
whether or not a significant impact exists and is thus to be distinguished from its use in
numerous other cases concerned with the timing of the seeking of review by intervenors at
some point after the project has commenced physically. See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on
Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); Jones v. Lynn,
477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the question of review of projects initiated
prior to the enactment of NEPA see Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the proposed agency action is sufficiently concrete to be said to
"significantly affect the environment" (and yet not be beyond that
stage where the impact statement will have utility to the agency in
its decisionmaking proeegg).101 However, an attempt to resolve this
question has been undertaken by a number of courts. Because the
impact statement is designed to aid agency decisionmaking rather
than to provide an ex post facto justification for it, these courts have
had the difficult task of attempting to reconcile the need to prepare
the impact statement prior to the agency's proposal, with the unfor-
tunate fact of life that the effects of the proposal may not actually
be known or anticipated at such an early stage. "2 Moreover, when
the implementation of the action is too remote, it will not yet have
a significant impact.
In order to balance these competing concerns, the D.C. Circuit
has developed four factors to be considered in determining timeli-
ness: 6  (1) the likelihood that the program will come into fruition
and how soon that will occur; (2) the extent that meaningful infor-
mation is presently available on the effects of the implementation
of the program and of its alternatives and their effects; (3) the
extent that irretrievable commitments are being made at the time
and that options might become precluded as refinements of the
proposal progress; and (4) the severity of the environmental impact
if the proposal progresses.
Applying these factors in S.LP.L, the court concluded that the
AEC's research and development program directed toward the de-
velopment of nuclear reactors required an impact statement even
though the program had not yet reached commercial feasibility. '
In reaching this decision, the court relied upon the magnitude of the
federal investment in the program, its controversial effects, the
speed with which the program had moved beyond pure scientific
161. NEPA fails to speak directly to the issue of when an impact statement must be filed,
providing only that it "shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review
process." Moreover, the CEQ Guidelines merely provide that a detailed statement will be
required "[als early as possible and in all cases prior to the agency decision .. " CEQ
Guidelines § 2, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971). Thus all NEPA and the CEQ tell us is that the
impact statement must be prepared and circulated early enough to effect the decisionmaking
process. See Fishman, A Preliminary Assessment of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969, 1973 URBAN LAW ANNUAL 209.
162. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976);
S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
163. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 1095-96.
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research toward creation of a viable model, and the manner in which
investment in this technology was likely to restrict the future alter-
natives. Thus, it reasoned, that to wait until commercial feasibility
had been reached would be to preclude the usefulness of the EIS and
any meaningful consideration of environmental factors.
The Supreme Court, in reviewing Sierra Club v. Morton,' 5 re-
cently rejected the D.C. Circuit's approach to the timing issue.
Despite a persuasive opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall, concurring
in part and dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the
majority, stated:
The statute clearly states when an impact statement is required,
and mentions nothing about a balancing of factors ....
[Under the first sentence of §102(2)(C) the moment at which
an agency must have a final statement ready "is the time at
which it makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for
federal action." [citations omitted] The procedural duty im-
posed upon agencies by this section is quite precise, and the role
of the courts in enforcing that duty is similarly precise. A court
has no authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a
balancing of court-devised factors, determine a point during the
germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact
statement should be prepared.'"
Although concurring in the Court's conclusion that the court of
appeals was wrong in granting the Sierra Club an injunction, Mr.
Justice Marshall dissented from the above quoted section of the
majority opinion.
In short, the Court offers nothing but speculation, misconception
and exaggeration to reject a reasonably designed test for enforc-
ing the duty NEPA imposes upon the federal agencies. Whatever
difficulties the Court may have with the initial application of the
test in this case-and I agree that an injunction was not war-
ranted on the facts before the court of appeals-the Court has
articulated no basis for interring the test before it has been given
a chance to breathe.' 7
Several other courts have considered the question of timeliness
in the context of highway and airport construction programs, but
165. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S. Ct. 2718 (1976).
166. Id. at 2728-29 (emphasis in original).
167. Id. at 2736.
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without the detailed analysis of the D.C. Circuit. In Upper Pecos
Association v. Stans,6 8 the Tenth Circuit held that an impact
statement was not required prior to the offer of a grant of funds to
a state for highway construction through a national forest, where
the agency had yet to approve the location or the construction
plans' 9 of the proposed highway. The court's only guidance in so
holding was that an impact statement must be filed "at some point
before commencement of the project."'' 0
The Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision in Lathan v. Volpe, 7'
helped to close in on this chronological "point" by holding that the
Department of Transportation's approval of a proposed highway
location required an impact statement even though final approval
had yet to be given for either the highway's design or its construc-
tion plans, because of the realization that once the highway plan-
ning process has reached its latter stages most of the flexibility in
selecting alternative plans would be lost. Conversely, the Ninth
Circuit has also held that the Federal Aviation Agency's approval
of an airport layout does not require an impact statement'72 because
whereas highway location approval constitutes "a decision, in the
ordinary course, final, that a federal aid highway is approved for
a particular location," under the airport aid scheme the "single
decision to fund or not to fund a project" comes at the tentative
allocation rather than the layout approval stage.'73
Thus it was found that there had been no irreversible and irretrieva-
ble commitment of resources at the time of approval. 7 '
A number of courts have also held that agency "proposals"
which significantly affect the environment, such as a Department
of Interior budget proposal of approximately $200,000,000 for the
financing of the 350 refuges making up the National Wildlife Refuge
System,'75 or the Atomic Energy Commission's budget proposals for
168. 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972) (judgment was vacated
and remanded to determine whether the case had become moot).
169. The location of the proposed highway and its construction plans and specifications
must be approved by the United States Forest Service before a grant of a right-of-way
easement is given and such an easement is necessary to permit the use of National Forest
lands for highway purposes. Id.
170. Id. at 1236.
171. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972).
172. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
173. Id. at 328, citing City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 1972).
174. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
175. Sierra Club v. Morton, 395 F. Supp. 1187 (D.D.C. 1975).
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its technology research and development programs,' require the
filing of an impact statement even though they are not "final agency
decisions."
Some courts have even gone so far as to suggest that since the
environmental consideration process should be ongoing, NEPA may
require constant re-evaluations of projects at various times. These
cases, however, have invariably dealt with projects initiated prior
to the enactment of NEPA for which environmental interests have
sought an initial impact statement, rather than with projects in
which the courts have required a number of statements at different
stages in the project.'77
The Supreme Court's cavalier rejection of the D.C. Circuit's
test for determining the ripeness of an agency proposal for the filing
of an EIS is unfortunate. Its literal reading of section 102(2)(C) is
overly simplistic and it is suggested that the timing of an EIS state-
ment, in those cases where timing is a critical issue, should be
determined by consideration of the four factors set out by the D.C.
Circuit. This would serve to give effect to the NEPA mandate that
environmental values be considered at every important stage of the
decisionmaking process.
6. PROJECT SEGMENTATION AND CUMULATIVE COMPONENT IMPACTS
A considerable amount of judicial labor has also been spent in
attempting to determine whether an EIS is required for an action
which, although relatively harmless by itself, constitutes a signifi-
cant environmental impact when considered together with other
actions.
The earliest effort to analyze this problem was concerned with
determining whether an agency had segmented"' a one project in
order to avoid the EIS requirement. Although the courts have been
quick to hold that NEPA could not be circumvented by dividing up
a project into relatively insignificant components, 7" this rule
176. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
177. See, e.g., E.D.F. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d
677 (9th Cir. 1974).
178. For a discussion of the division of projects commenced before the adoption of
NEPA, but in progress afterward, in the separate stages for purposes of determining whether
the Act's impact statement requirement must be complied with see E.D.F. v. TVA, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
179. See Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1971); Indian Lookout
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against segmentation was not construed to be absolute. I0 Instead,
the courts usually looked to either the functional relationship be-
tween such individually minor actions'"' or to the coercive effect one
action might have on creating others' and have only required an
EIS where a sufficient relationship existed between such actions
that they could be considered to be components of one larger action.
With the realization that the environment could be affected as
significantly by the cumulative impact of many functionally unre-
lated minor actions as by one larger action requiring an EIS, a
number of courts became increasingly more concerned with the
cumulative impact of individual actions than with their functional
relationship. 3 This shift in analysis allowed these courts to make a
much more accurate determination of the true environmental ef-
fects of an action by freeing them from having to consider largely
irrelevant questions concerning the relationship between various
actions and allowing them instead to concentrate purely on ques-
tions of environmental impact.
In Sierra Club v. Morton,"4 the D.C. Circuit offered some
guidance in defining a "broad agency program" which requires its
own cumulative impact statement by rejecting the argument that
such an impact statement is necessary only when the agency desig-
nates its actions as a program. Instead, the court concluded that
Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa), modified, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1972);
Conservation Soc'y v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd, 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
See also Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975).
180. Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
181. Conservation Soc'y v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D. Vt. 1972) (highway segment held
to be "entirely" independent of the remainder of highway project so that it did not require
an impact statement); Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Friends
of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1975).
182. In Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) the court held that segmentation of a highway
project which would traverse parkland into three parts, with only the middle one running
through the parkland, was not permissible to avoid the filing of an impact statement on the
non-parkland segments because their construction would compel the building of the middle
segment through the parkland. See also Conservation Soc'y v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761 (D.
Vt. 1972) and Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
183. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976);
M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); N.R.D.C. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972). See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972) and Hanly v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), which incorporate this factor into their two-pronged
test for determining significant impact. For a further discussion of this test see section V, B
infra.
184. 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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where the federal government attempts to control the development
of a definite region through the exercise of its power to control
leases, mining plans, rights of way, and water option contracts, it
is engaged in a program requiring a cumulative impact statement.
However, as noted previously, the Supreme Court recently
overturned the D.C. Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.'
The Court found that the federal government had not, in fact, at-
tempted to control the development of coal production in the Great
Plains states through a regional program. Furthermore, the Court
rejected the Sierra Club's argument that a regional EIS was re-
quired on all coal-related projects in the region because they were
intimately related, holding that the Department of the Interior had
not been arbitrary or capricious in its decision not to handle Great
Plains coal production through a regional program.
The Supreme Court did accept the Sierra Club's position that
when several proposals for coal-related actions that will have
cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region
are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental
consequences must be considered together. '
However, the Court concluded that there was no proposal for region-
wide action by the Department of the Interior requiring a regional
impact statement.18
Thus, the mode of analysis which courts will take in the future
is far from clear. Although there can be little doubt that project
segmentation intended to avoid the filing of an impact statement
will not be allowed, it is not at all certain whether courts have
progressed beyond the functional interdependence mode of analysis
to a consideration of the overall cumulative impact of an action with
related and further contemplated actions. Moreover, it is also ques-
tionable whether other courts will be able to follow the D.C. Cir-
cuit's lead by requiring impact statements analyzing the cumula-
tive impact of "broad agency programs," and, if so, how they will
choose to define such "programs."
185. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 96 S.Ct. 2718 (1976).
186. Id. at 2730.
187. Id. at 2732-33.
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7. CONTROVERSIALITY
Many courts have discussed,' but few have relied upon"9 the
controversiality of a project as a factor in determining whether an
impact statement should be filed. This concern is undoubtedly the
result of the CEQ Guidelines which provide that "[p]roposed ac-
tions, the environmental impact of which is likely to be highly con-
troversial, should be covered in all cases [by an impact state-
mentl."' 190 Nevertheless, courts have usually been content to pay lip
service to this principle and to observe that CEQ Guidelines, while
persuasive, are not mandatory. 9' Further confusion is created by the
fact that the CEQ Guidelines fail to answer the question of how one
measures whether action is "highly controversial." For instance,
"will the contest of a single individual, or a single conservation
organization, suffice, or will it take five complainants?"' 92
Judicial decisions have, however, generally made it clear that
the term "controversial" refers to situations where a substantial
dispute exists as to the environmental effects of the proposed action
and not merely to opposition to the intended use of the project.'93
Although this position has been criticized,'94 its logic has become
even more compelling in light of recent attempts to use NEPA as
an instrument of discrimination against the poor by seeking to in-
clude socio-economic impact resulting from the influx of low income
188. See, e.g., Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
189. But see Silva v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972) (impact statement
required under HUD regulations where a controversy existed concerning drainage facilities
of proposed housing project).
190. CEQ Guidelines § 5(b), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
191. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); Hiram Clarke Civic Club,
Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Kleindienst, 382 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. I1. 1973).
192. Karp, NEPA: Major Federal Action Significantly Affecting the Quality of the
Human Environment, 11 AM. Bus. L.J. 209, 235 (1974).
193. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823
(2d Cir. 1972); Citizens for Reid State Park v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 783 (D. Me. 1972).
194. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 836-40 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., dissent-
ing). Chief Judge Friendly argued that the term controversial as used in the CEQ Guidelines
referred to any "intense opposition, even if the actual environmental impact is readily appar-
ent," because in such situations those opposing the action would certainly file suit for non-
compliance with NEPA anyway. The filing of the EIS in such situations would preclude these
lawsuits. Friendly further argued that such impact statements would provide new informa-
tion which might turn up unexpected environmental findings and that the agency's action
in filing the impact statement itself will give the project's opponents the feeling that their
objections are being considered.
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people into an area accompanying a proposed agency action as
proper consideration in making the threshold determination.115
Thus, it appears that while controversiality surrounding the
extent of an environmental impact created by a proposed agency
action may be considered in making a threshhold determination,
neighborhood opposition standing alone will not compel a finding of
significant impact. 9" Nevertheless,
[tihe only conclusion that one can draw from the existing case
law on this point is that it is highly uncertain. . . .from the
question of what type of neighborhood opposition will suffice to
demand preparation of an EIS, to whether neighborhood opposi-
tion is even relevant, to whether the Guidelines need be ap-
plied."'
B. Judicially Developed Tests
Although various "tests" have been espoused by a number of
courts in order to determine whether an agency action will signifi-
cantly affect the environment, they have invariably been in the form
of post facto legal conclusions, rather than meaningful frameworks
of analysis. Thus, courts have held that an EIS must be filed where
the agency action will either "arguably,""' "reasonably,""' 9 or "po-
tentially""2 ° have a significant impact or where the agency's decision
not to file would be "arbitrary and capricious"' "' or not in "good
faith compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements."2 2 While
such so-called tests offer considerable flexibility, they provide little
195. See Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
196. Simmans v. Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
197. Karp, supra note 192, at 236.
198. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv.,
487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973); SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
199. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Harlem Valley
Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974) which held that requirements of what
an agency must consider is governed by the "rule of reason."
200. M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974).
201. Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc.
v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although these cases are really dealing with
the question of the scope of judicial review, it is not always possible to separate the scope of
review from these "tests" because they have the same post facto nature. For a further discus-
sion of the scope of judicial review see section II supra.
202. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
nating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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in the way of judicial certainty or guidance 03 in analyzing what
constitutes a significant impact, because they put the emphasis
upon subsequent judicial review rather than upon informed agency
decisionmaking in the first place.
One exception to this ex post facto type of analysis, however,
was the development of a two-pronged analytical framework in
Hanly II, under which an agency is required to review the proposed
action in light of both
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environ-
mental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the
area affected by it, and
(2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of
the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from
its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the af-
fected area."0 4
This test implemented the second circuit's belief that while conduct
conforming to existing uses will usually have less significant adverse
consequences than action which represents a radical change, even
a slight increase in the adverse conditions forming an existing envi-
ronmental balance may sometimes bring about significant harm, so
that the absolute as well as the comparative effects of an action
must be considered.
Although the bifurcated Hanly H approach clearly provides a
valuable first step in developing a framework to analyze the degree
of environmental impact produced by agency action, it lacks both
the comprehensiveness necessary to make it universally applicable
and the detail required to insure that agencies will consider the
proper factors prior to judicial review.
VI. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
A. The Need for a Liberal Construction of the EIS Requirement
NEPA makes environmental protection a part of the mandate
203. This need for guidance is crucial in developing a meaningful framework of analysis,
because federal agencies' inabilities to discern the level of impact upon the environment has
largely resulted from the difficulty they have experienced in deciding what factors to consider
in making the threshold determination that an impact statement is required. See Note,
Factors to be Considered in Making a Threshold Determination that an EIS is Necessary
Under the NEPA of 1969, 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 419 (1974).
204. 471 F.2d at 830-31. Judge Friendly, dissenting, opted for a broader definition-
whenever the action would "arguably have an adverse impact." Id. at 838.
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of every federal agency'" and thus the phrase "actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment," ' which triggers
the action forcing provisions" 7 of the EIS requirement, must be
construed to be intentionally broad in order to effectuate the Act's
policy of "promot[ing] an across-the-board adjustment in federal
agency decisionmaking so as to make the quality of the environ-
ment a concern of every federal agency."2 °
The EIS requirement was intended as the means to implement
Congress' objectives of requiring a comprehensive approach to envi-
ronmental management and of facing problems of pollution
"while they are still of manageable proportions and while alterna-
tive solutions are still available" rather than to persist in environ-
mental decision-making wherein "policy is established by default
and inaction" and environmental decisions "continue to be made
in small but steady increments" that perpetuate the mistakes of
the past without being dealt with until "they reach crisis propor-
tions."209
Thus, the impact statement is essential to the decisionmaking pro-
cess because it provides a basis for the evaluation of the benefit of
the proposed project in light of its environmental risks and a com-
parison with the risks presented by alternative courses of action. 2 0
The impact statement requirement also serves as an environ-
mental full disclosure law21I by providing an accessible means for
opening up the agency decisionmaking process and subjecting it to
critical evaluation by those outside the agency, including both the
public212 which will be directly affected by its decisions, and the
205. See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972); Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
206. § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
207. The so-called "action forcing" provision of NEPA is 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970)
which requires the filing of an impact statement by an agency whenever one of its proposed
actions will significantly affect the quality of the human environment. See Hearings on
S. 1075, S.237 and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 116 (1969).
208. S.I.P.I. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
209. N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972), citing S. REP. No. 91-296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969).
210. N.R.D.C. v. TVA, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974); N.R.D.C. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
211. Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1973);
Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).
212. See, e.g., Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974); E.D.F. v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
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courts"' which must review its decisions.
Moreover, environmentally concerned individuals and groups
may not be able to provide an effective analysis of environmental
factors because of limited resources, both in terms of money and
technical expertise. The impact statement requirement, in effect,
places the burden upon the government to make such an analysis,
as well as to carry the burden of proof that no significant impact
exists when its failure to file an impact statement is challenged."'
Thus, NEPA represents the first comprehensive congressional
response to the environmental concerns that surfaced so dramati-
cally during the 1960's and embodies the realization that we no
longer have the margin of error with regard to the environment that
we once enjoyed.2"5 The ultimate issues presented by the short-
sighted, conflicting and often selfish demands upon the finite re-
sources of the earth are clear. In order to realize Congress' intent to
assure that all federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the
challenge of these demands upon the environment,"' it is necessary
213. See, e.g., Harlem Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974);
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972). A number of courts have gone one step further
by holding that NEPA was intended to effect substantive changes in decisionmaking so that
purely mechanical compliance with procedural requirements alone, without giving effect to
environmental goals in reaching decisions, is insufficient to comply with NEPA's mandates.
M.P.I.R.G. v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974); E.D.F. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972). It naturally follows that to give effect to this congressional intent, courts must
have the power to review the agency's substantive decision in order to determine that the
decision was reached after a good faith consideration of environmental factors and that the
balance of environmental costs and benefits struck is not so arbitrary or capricious that
insufficient weight has been given to environmental values. See also Sierra Club v. Morton,
510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); E.D.F. v.
Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th
Cir. 1973); E.D.F. v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1973).
214. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Harlem
Valley Transp. Ass'n v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974); Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park
& Planning Comm'n v. United States Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). But see
Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
Furthermore, courts have generally followed the rule that the mere statement by an
agency that no significant impact exists is insufficient to satisfy the procedural requirements
of NEPA. Rather, an assessment statement must be given, providing convincing reasons why
the project does not require a detailed impact statement. See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460
F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Arizona Public
Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973); SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189
(D.D.C.), den. of application for stay of inj. sub. nor. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v.
SCRAP, 409 U.S. 1207 (1972).




that NEPA's "action forcing" impact statement requirement be
given the broadest possible application. Moreover, intelligent deci-
sions concerning the use of our environmental resources can only be
made if all the consequences and alternatives to actions affecting
the quality of the environment are known." 7
B. The Proposed Framework of Analysis
It is essential that a framework of analysis have both the neces-
sary flexibility to make it useful in the variety of environmental
contexts in which the question of significant impact may arise and
the detailed structural guidance required to allow agencies to make
the proper threshold determination in the first instance as well as
to give the courts a meaningful basis for review of that decision.
Moreover, it is also apparent that no mathematically precise for-
mula for determining significant impact can exist, and that deci-
sionmakers must instead rely upon a comprehensive framework of
analysis which will provide essential factors to be considered as well
as a mode for their analysis.
Such a framework of analysis is presented in the following
pages. This proposed framework has been developed from the phi-
losophy behind NEPA, and many of the cases and comments
construing it.
The proposed framework analyzes the impact of an agency ac-
tion from eight different perspectives, each of which has been devel-
oped in order to evaluate a possible form that an environmental
effect might take. This analysis is accomplished by utilizing a num-
ber of factors and/or tests within each of the eight areas, which are
to be considered in the context of giving NEPA's "action forcing"
provisions the board interpretation necessary to implement the
Act's previously discussed goals. Moreover, each of these eight
forms of environmental impact is by itself sufficient to significantly
affect the environment. Thus, a finding of significant impact under
any one category would require the filing of an EIS.
1. NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
The factors which are relevant in determining the need for an
EIS in the case of a project which will directly affect the natural
217. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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environment are the most easily identified. These factors are those
most commonly perceived to be that stuff of which the environment
is made: streams, lakes, air, trees, plants, wildlife, and ecological
systems generally. These factors likewise encompass geological, his-
torical, and archeological considerations.
The effects of pollution, destruction, and alteration of the natu-
ral habitat are the major foci of consideration under this section of
the proposed test. Since such effects on the environment tend to be
the best understood elements against which protection is needed,
and because the existing case law has already adequately cata-
logued the relevant factors involved herein, an expanded discussion
is not necessary.
Thus, the first component of the proposed framework of analy-
sis is the consideration of those effects on the natural environment
which have traditionally been held to degrade its quality, such as
pollution and the killing of or injury to wildlife and natural cycles.
2. THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
While it is clear that NEPA is concerned with effects upon the
urban environment,"'8 the Act contains no exhaustive list of environ-
mental factors to be considered in analyzing these effects. 19 Never-
theless, a number of factors must, by their nature, assume para-
mount importance in such analysis. These factors form the nucleus
of an environmental checklist for evaluating the impact of an action
upon the urban environment.
The most obvious of these factors are increases in air and water
pollution and the availability of waste and sewage removal facili-
ties. Nearly as obvious are the adequacy of mass transportation
systems, effects upon traffic and parking, and increases in conges-
tion. However, the quality of the urban environment is affected by
more than just pollution and transportation problems. Therefore,
the list must also include the availability of utilities, increases in
noise and obnoxious odors, effects upon population density and dis-
tribution, alterations in the character of neighborhoods, aesthetics,.
the destruction of historical landmarks, deteriorating neighborhood
influences, relocation problems, energy demands, and even in-
creases in crime and the availability of drugs. Care should be taken,
218. See section V, A, 2 supra.
219. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 31:71
NEPA
however, to avoid undue consideration of socio-economic factors,
such as the influx of low income workers or the alleged anti-social
propensities of the poor, because NEPA was not intended to be used
as a tool for discrimination and such factors have limited, if any,
environmental relevance.
As has previously been noted, however, "the environmental
problems of the city are not [always] as readily identifiable as
clean air and clean water . . ."220 and thus any checklist must be
adaptable to both the particular circumstances and the times. This
has been clearly demonstrated by the recent increased concern with
energy demands. Therefore, this checklist cannot be considered
complete, but rather only the nucleus for determining the impact
that a proposed action will have upon the urban environment. The
need for additional factors must be determined by the particular
environmental exigencies of the proposed action and the ability of
such factors to influence the action's impact upon the quality of life
for city residents.
Thus, the second component of the proposed framework of
analysis is the consideration of an action's impact upon the urban
environment by utilizing the factor checklist presented above in
conjunction with whatever additional factors are demanded by the
particular circumstances to measure such an impact.
3. INDIRECT EFFECTS OF AGENCY ACTION
It can hardly be doubted that an agency action which directly
allows a third party to affect the environment, itself affects the
environment in much the same way. For purposes of making the
threshold determination, it is necessary to consider the environmen-
tal impacts of such a third party action as a secondary effect of the
agency action which allows it.2 '
Yet, as previously noted, the reach of NEPA is not unlimited.2"
Thus, while there may be no problem concluding that an agency's
grant of funds, a license, or a permit affects the environment where
the recipient takes action which affects the environment," 3 the anal-
ysis becomes much more difficult where the recipient merely acts
220. See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
221. See section V, A, 3 supra.
222. See notes 149-151 supra and accompanying text.
223. See notes 137-141 supra and accompanying text.
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so as to allow a third party to take action which has environmental
consequences. Therefore, while it is easy to decide that an agency's
approval of a construction loan will have the same environmental
effects as the actual construction, it is not so easy to conclude that
an agency's approval of a bank charter will have the same environ-
mental effects as a construction project subsequently initiated
under a loan from the bank.
The question becomes one of finding a logical limitation to the
agency's "responsibility" under NEPA to consider such indirect ef-
fects. The most promising solution to this problem lies in the adop-
tion of the tort theory of proximate cause to EI analysis. Under this
theory the agency would be "liable" for those actions it had taken
which foreseeably224 would allow others to affect the environment.
Although the theory of proximate cause has developed in re-
sponse to the fault system of our tort law, it nonetheless creates a
limitation based upon the foreseeable consequences of an action
under particular circumstances.22 This theory is also appropriate in
EIS analysis. Thus, while the tort law application of foreseeability
is based upon the defendant's duty of care owed to the plaintiff, the
NEPA application would be viewed in terms of the agency's duty
to file an EIS when its actions significantly affect the environment.
Such a concept of proximate cause offers the necessary flexibility to
be useful in EIS analysis and yet has been the subject of so much
case law commentary that it is more than an amorphous term like
"significantly."
Thus, the third component of the proposed framework of analy-
sis is the evaluation of those non-agency environmental impacts
which proximately result from agency action in the first instance.
4. EXISTING USES AND ZONING RESTRICTIONS
Although pre-existing uses of an area are clearly relevant in
determining whether a proposed action will significantly affect the
environment, there is no assurance that such uses are either envi-
ronmentally motivated or the product of informed decisionmak-.
ing.226 Moreover, it must be recognized that even
[o]ne more factory polluting air and water in an area zoned for
224. See W. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS § 42 (4th ed. 1971).
225. Id.
226. See section V, A, 4 supra.
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industrial use may represent the straw that breaks the back of the
environmental camel . . . . [and thus] the absolute, as well as
comparative, effects of a major federal action must be consid-
ered. 227
Nevertheless, when considered in the proper context, evalua-
tion of pre-existing area uses provides a helpful tool for analysis and
is therefore incorporated into the proposed framework. This context
is provided by considering such pre-existing uses in terms of the
two-pronged Hanly II test which evaluates
(1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmen-
tal effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area
affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environ-
mental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm
that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions
or uses in the affected area.228
By adopting the Hanly II formula in evaluating such existing uses,
both the cumulative and incremental impact created by the pro-
posed action are considered. Moreover, because such an evaluation
constitutes only one of eight areas that are analyzed under the over-
all proposed framework, the fact that the pre-existing use might not
be the product of informed decisionmaking or environmental moti-
vation will not hinder the ultimate determination of a significant
impact requiring an EIS.
The consideration of local zoning ordinances, however, is not
included within the proposed framework of analysis. While it con-
tains the same drawbacks as the evaluation of pre-existing area
uses, it is not as susceptible to cure. Zoning ordinances are merely
intangible restrictions put on the use of property by local governing
officials and therefore are useless in measuring the environmental
impact of an action, except to determine whether such impact is
consistent with local expectations for the area. Such local expecta-
tions are motivated by a variety of factors, ranging from the environ-
mental to the political and social. Moreover, they are not necessarily
the result of informed decisionmaking.
Therefore, the fourth component of the framework of analysis
is the evaluation of the projection in light of pre-existing area uses,
through the utilization of the two-prong Hanly II mode of analysis.
227. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir. 1972).
228. Id. at 830-31.
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5. TIMING
For certain agency actions it is more difficult to determine
when an EIS is required than whether it is required. Despite the
Supreme Court's rejection of the D.C. Circuit's test, S.LP.L has
gone a long way toward identifying that point at which an EIS is
required. The following factors, adopted from S.LP.I, should facili-
tate the determination of when an EIS is mandated.
a. Feasibility
If the actual implementation of the project is unlikely or sub-
stantially uncertain, no EIS is required. On the other hand, the
likelihood of, and nearness to practical implementation should trig-
ger the filing of an EIS. Arguably, this would mandate an EIS where
commercial development is not feasible but where government im-
plementation is probable.22
The amount of government investment should have great bear-
ing on the feasibility or likelihood of implementation. This is true
because the more time and money invested by the government
agency in developing the technology, the more likely that the project
will be pursued until successful completion. Writing off a $10,000
investment which has failed is more easily justified than dismissing
one which has cost $10,000,000. The converse is not necessarily true.
The fact that government expenditure has thus far been minimal
does not mean that development is not feasible and therefore no EIS
is required. The impact may be great notwithstanding the relatively
insignificant monetary investment. For example, the government
decision to dump barrels of poisonous gas at sea may cost little to
implement but the ramifications of those barrels leaking could be
significant.
b. Present Availability of Information
If an EIS is to be required, there must be more than speculation
on which to base the report. Thus, where the costs required to com-
pile and project the potential environmental effects of a project are
exorbitant an EIS will not be required. This is also true where alter-
natives cannot be anticipated due to the inability of the project
coordinators to determine the anticipated impacts. A claim of great
229. See 87 HARV. L. REV. 1050, 1058 (1974).
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expense due to the obscurity or nonavailability of the information,
however, will not shield the agency from the EIS requirement.
While the avoidance of sheer speculation and star gazing are desira-
ble, NEPA's goal is to force agencies to disclose what the environ-
mental effects of its actions will be. Moreover, where the impacts
are not readily ascertainable, the greater the perceived potential
impact the more willing courts should be to require expenditure by
agencies to obtain information regarding this potential impact.
Similarly, although agency heads may "dream out loud," once the
dream becomes finite, 3' an EIS should be filed.
c. Any Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
Should the Project be Implemented
This term is, for the most part, self explanatory. In addition,
this factor "focuses on past expenditures and vested interests al-
ready emerging in connection with a new technological development
even prior to any implementation decision."2 '
d. Severity of Potential Environmental Effects
This factor can be tied to (b) above. Thus, the greater the
potential environmental impact, the sooner the EIS should be filed.
e. Need for Technology Compels Development
Where the demand for the emerging technology is so great that
research will continue until successful, the postponement of prepar-
ing an EIS due to the speculative nature or great cost of so doing
should be looked upon less favorably.232 An example of such a situa-
tion is the current pursuit of alternative sources of energy. Also
important is the growth over time in the significance of the technol-
ogy under development.233
Any one of the components of this section should be sufficient
to trigger the requirement for an impact statement.
Thus, the fifth element of the proposed framework is a consider-
ation of the proper timing for the impact statement utilizing the five
230. Finite can be equated with an agency expenditure or funding request to implement
the "dream."
231. 87 HARV. L. R~v. at 1059.
232. Id. at 1060.
233. Id. at 1061.
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factors discussed above to facilitate the determination as to when a
proposed action will have a significant environmental impact.
6. CUMULATIVE IMPACT
Because the cumulative impact of various individually minor
actions can affect the environment as significantly as a single larger
action, threshold analysis is more appropriately concerned with
evaluating the cumulative environmental impact of a number of
smaller actions than with trying to determine whether such smaller
actions are in fact components of one larger action which was seg-
mented in order to avoid EIS analysis.234 The functional interde-
pendence of such individual actions is largely irrelevant in terms of
evaluating the actions' effect upon the environment, except perhaps
to impose artificial policy oriented constraints upon the extent to
which an agency must consider such individually insignificant ac-
tions in making its threshold determination.
While some constraints on cumulative impact evaluation are
clearly necessary in order to prevent impact statement analysis from
being rendered unfeasible, more meaningful limitations in terms of
environmental analysis can be imposed by basing such constraints
on the degree of geographic, environmental, or programmatic rela-
tionship between these actions, rather than upon the extent of their
functional interdependence. Even these constraints, however, are
not completely compatible with the previously enunciated policy
behind the proposed framework. 3 ' Thus, the degree of relationship
that is required to trigger this analysis must be very slight3 ' at most.
A natural outgrowth of this analysis is the further requirement
that a separate EIS be filed to evaluate the cumulative impact of
"broad agency programs" even though statements have already
been filed for the programs' individual components. 37 This further
EIS analysis will insure the consideration of any cumulative im-
234. See section V, A, 6 supra.
235. See section VI, A supra.
236. The definition of the term "very slight" is, itself, susceptible to treatment by an
entire article and therefore beyond the scope of this work. Nevertheless, when considered in
light of the strongly expressed policies behind the proposed framework's broad interpretation
of the EIS requirement, the term is sufficiently meaningful to be useful in the analysis of
cumulative environmental impacts by treating it in the context of its normal meaning, to wit:
"ITo a small degree or extent; somewhat." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 656 (6th ed. 1972).
237. See note 184 supra and accompanying text.
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pacts which might be otherwise slighted in the agency's evaluations
of its individual actions. The need for this further analysis should
not be dependent upon an agency designation that a group of ac-
tions constitutes a program, but rather upon the existence of sys-
tematic federal actions which significantly affect the environment
over a wide geographic range. 38
Therefore, the sixth component of the proposed framework is
the analysis of the cumulative environmental impact produced by
the proposed action's interplay with other existing and contem-
plated agency actions that are related either environmentally, geo-
graphically, or programmatically.
7. CONTROVERSIALITY
To include controversial, non-discrimination based projects
among those actions requiring an EIS would expand the existing
case law. However, this expansion is neither inconsistent with the
thrust of NEPA nor the CEQ Guidelines. Moreover, while the facts
discussed under the other headings are more finite in nature, "con-
troversiality" allows for the consideration of perceived environ-
mental effects. The extent to which this perception will be seriously
considered as a factor by the courts or administrators should be
determined, in part, by the extent to which the perception ap-
proaches reality. The more this category overlaps with the others,
the more likely that the perceived environmental harm is in fact
reality-based and the more deference it should be accorded.
In addition, it is submitted that perceptions can in themselves
lead to real effects and to this extent they should also be given
consideration. That is, perceptions tend to be self-fulfilling with
regard to the human response to a perceived danger. Thus, if resi-
dents feel a neighborhood project will endanger their welfare, they
will move, particularly where those fears are not quieted by rational
explanation. Such perceptions, therefore, even without a factual
basis, are worthy of federal agency consideration. Thus, even where
mistakenly perceived effects create great controversy, an EIS should
be filed to clarify misperceptions.
The rationale supporting this approach is compelling in light of
NEPA's broad policy statements.
238. Once again a more detailed definition of the term "program" would require consid-
erable analysis which is beyond the scope of this article and is therefore left to subsequent
articles.
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The very uncertainty created by the conflicting assertions made
by the parties as to the environmental effect [of the proposed
project] underscores the necessity of the [EIR] to substitute
some degree of factual certainty for tentative opinion and specu-
lation."29
This is especially true since one major purpose of the EIS is "to
inform other government agencies, and the public generally, of the
environmental impact of a proposed project . ..and to demon-
strate to an apprehensive citizenry that the agency has in fact ana-
lyzed and considered the ecological implications of its actions." 4"
Thus, the seventh component of the proposed framework is the
consideration of controversial actions, which are to be defined in
terms of a bona fide perception of those actions' effects on the
environment.
8. PER SE CATEGORIES-ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIONS
Certain government actions, whether in the research or a more
advanced stage, have such potentially far reaching environmental
consequences that, regardless of the degree of federal involvement,
the action must be carefully scrutinized.
Exemplary of such government actions are genetic or biological
engineering and the development and implementation of nuclear
technology. Other projects with equally potentially hazardous or
monumental implications for humanity are easily identified. It is
submitted that extensive EIS's should be required for such projects
and that they should be continually updated. Surely, the benefits
to be derived from such a procedure clearly outweigh the potential
costs. Great expense should not be an excuse for failure to prepare
an EIS in this category.
It is not the likelihood of a catastrophic effect which is impor-
tant here but rather the potential for it.
Thus, the final factor to be considered in the proposed frame-
work leaves no room for administrative discretion. If the action in
question is potentially ultrahazardous, an EIS must be filed.
239. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 814, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 390 (1973)
(reference is to California's requirement for an Environmental Impact Report pursuant to
that state's Environmental Quality Act which is modeled after NEPA and construed simi-
larly). See E.D.F. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 Cal. App. 3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1972).




Existing case law under NEPA relating to the preparation of an
EIS when a major federal action significantly affects the quality of
the human environment is confused at best. It is confused both
because the statutory language is vague and because the courts have
tended to approach the problem from the standpoint of scope of
review.
Attempts to judicially clarify the language have not been help-
ful. Administrators and judges alike must have a clear understand-
ing of when an EIS is required in order to fully implement NEPA.
Many cases have identified numerous factors which were found
to be relevant in determining whether to file an EIS. These factors
have been utilized and in some instances expanded in order to de-
velop a proposed framework which will hopefully provide the guid-
ance heretofore lacking.
"Significance" cannot be defined by a reviewing court when it
finds an administrative decision to be arbitrary, reasonable, ra-
tional, etc. This leaves the test undefined because it does not state
the facts that are determinative. Implementation of the proposed
analytical framework should fill the existing void and insure that
the quality of the human environment will be properly considered
in all federal actions which might diminish that quality.
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